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We focus on the implications of strategic interactions among research
intensive ￿rms on the rates of growth when the number of competing
￿r m si ss m a l la n d￿rms recognise the eﬀects their investment decisions
have on the production behaviour of their rivals. Similar to other results,
we ￿nd that the mode of oligopolist competition can have a great eﬀect on
the rate of growth, but we present novel channels of these eﬀects. More
importantly and unlike standard results, we show that for the Cournot
type of competition, a (constrained) socially optimal rate of growth can
be attained. On the other hand, this can never be achieved under the
more severe Bertrand competition. These ￿ndings are thus parallel to the
conclusions in strategic trade literature. Our results demonstrate that
conclusions from the ￿strategic trade￿ literature are robust enough, if ex-
tended into an explicitly dynamic general equilibrium framework. More
importantly, though, they make evident that the questions of optimal
policy design related to organisational structure and strategic conduct
are tractable in the framework of endogenous growth models in suﬃcient
detail.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The seminal achievements of the early 1990s in the area of endogenous growth
(Grossman and Helpman, 1990a,b, and Romer, 1990a,b) have greatly con-
tributed to our understanding of economic development and growth of nations.
In particular, they revealed important links through which the integration of
the world economy and international trade may in￿uence a country￿s growth
prospects. All of these important contributions highlighted the signi￿cance of
1scale technology and the imperfect mode of competition. In such a setting, the
engine of growth was ascribed to private incentives, unlike deus ex machina
forces in previous growth literature.
The failure of the earlier literature to account for private incentives behind
growth was remedied by introducing economies internal to ￿rms. Typically these
￿rms, whose products are vertically diﬀerentiated, engage in R&D activities
that have a positive impact on the level of technology as a production factor.
The introduction of technology with internal returns shifted attention to the
structure of private incentives, because it simultaneously raised the issue of
t h eo r g a n i s a t i o n a ls t r u c t u r eo ft h ee c o n o m y ,i . e . m o r en a r r o w l y ,t h en a t u r eo f
competition.
No matter how distinct these issues may appear, they are nevertheless closely
related. As Romer (1990b) observes, no ￿rm facing a downward sloping average
cost curve can survive pricing at marginal cost. If the ￿rm is to be viable,
it must enjoy some sort of monopoly power. He continues by arguing that the
problem is not in marginal cost pricing, but rather in the price-taking behaviour
assumed by perfect competition per se. In fact, monopolistic competition can be
as close to marginal cost pricing as the average cost curves are close to marginal
ones, yet, it is a necessary analytical tool that allows the increasing returns to
scale technology to be operational (Krugman 1995).
Although an imperfectly competitive environment enable the analysis of how
private motivation aﬀects growth, many channels of this vehicle remain unex-
plored. As Baldwin (1998) in his survey asserts, the treatment of ￿rms continues
2to be largely atomistic. Many authors (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1990a,b,
and, Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991a,b) introduce a monopolistically competi-
tive environment in the models of vertical diﬀerentiation with the Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) large number of ￿rms approximation. Such treatment of oligopolist com-
petition disregards the possibility of sophisticated decision-making taking place
on a ￿rm level. Vertically diﬀerentiated ￿rms in their competition on product
markets disregard the adverse eﬀects their actions may have on the behaviour of
their rivals. Such adverse eﬀects are likely to arise from decisions about pricing
policies as well as investment in R&D. In addition, the mode of competition in
product markets is an important factor for these eﬀects.
Thus, the design of monopolistic competition in most endogenous growth lit-
erature makes it impossible to explore many important incentive schemes that
might shape a country￿s development. For instance, it is believed that multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) are crucial to a country￿s growth performance, al-
though we still know little about how this channel might operate, how these ￿rms
interact, what the key considerations are that make the ￿rm invest abroad and
what the potentially adverse eﬀects are of such an activity, or how indigenous
￿rms react to it. This is the case despite the fact that the ￿elds of international
trade and industrial organisation recognise many approaches of modelling such
issues (Krugman, 1995). As a result, many important policy related questions
continue to go unanswered. For instance, the nature of competition plays a
prominent role in strategic trade literature when the optimal level and form of
government intervention towards R&D is sought, but is scarce in questions ad-
3dressed by endogenous growth models. This seems especially puzzling, as R&D
is the channel of sustained growth for many of them. Indeed, theorists involved
in strategic trade literature recognise this failure of endogenous growth models,
but consider them to be inappropriate for optimal policy design. In the words
of Neary (1998):
O n eb r a n c ho ft h e￿eld which considers R&D in detail is the re-
cent work on endogenous growth. However, the assumptions made
about industrial structure and ￿rm behaviour in that literature seem
unattractive in the context of discussions of policy design. R&D is
often assumed to be carried out by diﬀerent ￿rms from those en-
gaged in production. Moreover, notwithstanding the complexities
of the models in other respects, equilibrium is typically assumed to
be monopolistically competitive, so ￿rms do not engage in strategic
behaviour and entry into industry is free. For many purposes these
assumptions are not a drawback. However, for designing optimal
policies towards R&D they seem less appropriate.
There have been few attempts in the literature to address growth-related
issues in the market structure and strategic interactions of ￿rms. Van de Klun-
dert and Smulders (1997, henceforth denoted as K-S) and Smulders and van de
Klundert (1995) are among the few who do not resort to the large number of
￿rms approximation of Dixit and Stiglitz, and who openly consider static inter-
actions among ￿rms in product markets. As Yang and Heidra (1993) demon-
strate, more insight can be gained from studying monopolistic competition of
4the Dixit-Stiglitz type if the number of ￿rms is in fact small. The microeco-
nomics of interactions on the ￿rm level then gets more complex, because the
￿rms behave strategically in the sense that they recognise the eﬀects of their
actions on the behaviour of their rivals in a simple static game theoretical set-
ting. K-S treatment of this oligopolist set-up enables exploration of various
growth-related issues according to the mode of competition in product markets:
Bertrand and Cournot in a unifying manner. Yet, their analysis is con￿ned
to strategic interactions in the product markets and disregards the possibility
of interactions between investment and production decisions. Therefore, many
policy questions related to R&D cannot be analysed with suﬃcient complexity.
The present paper belongs into this strand of literature. It aims at extending
the framework of K-S to account for strategic interactions of ￿rms between
investment and production (pricing) decisions, without recourse to a diﬀerential
game approach. We do so in a standard endogenous growth model of horizontal
diﬀerentiation with accumulation of cost-reducing, ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge. In
this setting, we consider some of the adverse eﬀects a ￿rm￿s decision about its
R&D expenditure may have on another ￿rm￿s pro￿ts and behaviour during that
period.
These adverse eﬀects may occur through two channels. First, decisions about
research investment in￿uence the cost schedule of rival ￿rms (and hence their
pricing decisions) through knowledge spill-overs. Second, even without knowl-
edge spill-overs, the reduction of costs in one ￿rm has an impact on the pricing
decisions of other ￿rms in a static Nash equilibrium. Typically, the ￿rst channel
5(see, e.g. Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995) ignores these adverse eﬀects
and assume ￿rms are myopic in this sense. In models of vertical diﬀerentiation,
this assumption is often advocated as an approximation, if (i) knowledge spill-
overs are small, (ii) product types are well diﬀerentiated. The second channel
is ignored altogether by assuming symmetric equilibrium in production/pricing
actions unaﬀected by investment decisions.
The spill-over eﬀect is generally known and relies solely on the non-rival
nature of the R&D knowledge stock. We concentrate instead on the second
channel, since we feel that its approximation may conceal other potentially im-
portant channels through which strategic interactions of ￿rms aﬀect growth
and welfare. For instance, K-S ￿nd that oligopolist pricing always leads to
under-investment in ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge, irrespective of the mode of com-
petition, essentially because it distorts relative prices in the economy in favour
of non-technologically intensive goods. However, we show that a more careful
consideration of static strategic eﬀects creates an additional externality that
may (depending on the mode of competition) enhance the motivation to invest,
in a strategic manner, in order to increase pro￿ts and market share through the
reaction of rivals. We demonstrate that this externality can not only oﬀset the
distortion created by relative prices, but potentially other externalities as well1.
1Although our model assumes that the core of the knowledge is ￿rm-speci￿c, we allow
for external returns to knowledge accumulation, not appropriable by private decision makers.
The negative externality presented by non-appropriability makes the market rate of growth
fall short of that chosen by an idealised social planner, unless it is oﬀset by another positive
externality or removed by subsidies or taxes. The models based on ￿creative destruction￿, for
instance, usually display a type of positive externality that may entirely counterweight the
negative knowledge spill-over eﬀect. This eﬀect is based on the fact that the innovating ￿rm
does not internalise the negative eﬀect it may have on another ￿rm￿s innovation. For that
reason, it is called ￿business stealing￿ externality. On the other hand, the common result
in models of horizontal diﬀerentiation is that taxes and subsidies are required to restore the
6These ￿ndings are thus similar to conclusions in strategic trade literature
where ￿rms are engaged in a generic partial equilibrium two stage game: invest-
ing in cost reducing technology in the ￿rst stage and producing (or pricing) in
the other. The common result is that ￿rms tend to under-invest from the social
(cost-minimising) perspective in Bertrand and over-invest in the Cournot (Bran-
der, 1995) mode of competition. Our results demonstrate that conclusions from
this strategic trade literature are robust if extended into an explicitly dynamic
general equilibrium framework. More importantly, though, the results make it
evident that questions of optimal policy design related to organisational struc-
ture and strategic conduct are tractable in the framework of endogenous growth
models in suﬃcient riskness.
Similar in spirit to our paper is the work of Peretto (1996), who also recog-
nises the need to analyse the interactions of ￿rms with in-house R&D in oligopolist
competition. His theoretical game framework allows for the interaction of incen-
tives from investment to pricing decisions through knowledge spill-overs. Yet,
his analysis lacks an important channel of these interactions by assuming a
symmetric equilibrium in product markets not aﬀected by investment decisions.
Nor does he explicitly consider diﬀerent assumptions about market structure
the way K-S do.
Even though we extend the K-S framework to more complex strategic con-
duct, our treatment of the channels through which strategic behaviour aﬀects
growth is not exhaustive. We disregard, for instance, the strategic interactions
social optimum, as shown in K-S.
7of investment decisions in diﬀerent periods. This is a simpli￿cation, because
e v e ni ft h ec o r eo ft h ek n o w l e d g ei s￿rm-speci￿c, ￿rms still bene￿t from their ri-
val￿s research. As standard in the literature, we treat these eventual spill-overs
as unintentional and thus disregard the possibility that today￿s R&D invest-
ment aﬀects the rival￿s pro￿ts in future periods. Nevertheless, yet more insight
about the channels through which interactions among ￿rms aﬀect growth could
be gained from considering the ￿rms￿ decision making in an explicitly dynamic
game setting, an approach commonly referred to as diﬀerential games. However,
this strand of literature suﬀers from great computational diﬃculties, which seri-
ously constrain functional forms if the closed form solutions are to be analytically
tractable. Hence, we do not pursue this here, although Vencatachellum (1998)
shows the capacity of such a treatment using a modi￿e dv e r s i o no fR o m e r ￿ s1 9 9 0
model.
In the next two sections, we introduce a basic endogenous growth model with
￿rm-speci￿c knowledge that is a variant to that of van de Klundert and Smulders
(1997) and characterise its equilibrium. We chose to follow this model, because
by avoiding unnecessary deviations, we may directly compare the results and
extract the novel eﬀects of our exposition in a clear way. In the third section,
we study how these extra channels modify the traditional eﬀects of competition
on growth rates and how the market equilibrium compares to the one chosen by
an idealised social planner. As expected, the standard results in the literature
are special cases of ours when the part of strategic decision making which is a
subject of this paper is ignored. In the fourth section, we investigate whether
8strategic interactions alter the traditional result that growth rises with higher
concentration. The last section presents the conclusions.
2M o d e l
Because our general equilibrium model is essentially a standard one (see e.g.
van de Klundert and Smulders, 1997), we leave out most of the commentary
and concentrate on developing the basic results. This is best accomplished by
independently considering the private decisions and incentives of households,
R&D ￿rms, and traditional ￿rms, and ￿nally characterising the market and
social equilibria.
2.1 Households
There are a total of L households in the economy who own all production units
and supply them with a unit of labour as the only factor of production. In
each period, households consume two types of goods: a traditional one and
N varieties of technology intensive (hi-tech) goods. They trade oﬀ future for





where θ i st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dC is a consumption bundle consisting
of a traditional good Y , and a bundle of N imperfectly substitutable hi-tech
goods X, tied together by preferences of the form:













, †>1,σ ∈ (0,1),
9where σ, the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between Y and X, is the
share of hi-tech goods in the overall expenditure2. Since the utility function
is weakly separable in subutilities C and X,w em a yt r e a tt h e ma sc o m p o s i t e
consumption bundles and assign to them relevant composite price indices PC and
PX, which correspond to the unit expenditure functions necessary for achieving














·1/(†−1) ,( 2 )
where PY and {pi}N
i=1 are prices of Y and X goods faced by households in each
period3.
This separation enables us to examine a representative households decision
making in three steps: the intertemporal problem of choosing the time path of C,
the intratemporal problem of allocating C into X and Y , and the intratemporal
problem of allocating X into {xi}N
i=1.
2.1.1 The intertemporal problem
Choosing an optimal path of C in (1) is equivalent to choosing a path of total










)dt, s.t. œ St = Yt + rtSt − EC,t ,( 3 )
where St is the total amount of saving at period t, rt is the period￿s interest
rate and Yt is the household￿s income from factor ownership, treated in the
2In terms of the van de Klundert and Smulders paper, we choose the degree of risk aversion
ρ =1 . Their results are therefore comparable to ours only with this substitution.
3For brevity we suppress time indices in the following text where they are unambiguous.
10problem as exogenous, but consisting of labour income and distributed pro￿ts
of X and Y ￿rms net of interest payments. It is given as follows for the total of
L households:
Y = wL +
N X
j=1
πi + πY − rS, (4)
where w is the wage rate of homogenous labour and symbols πi, πY denote per
period pro￿ts of a representative hi-tech ￿rm, and the total of traditional ￿rms.
From the standard solution to the problem in (3), it follows that the optimal
path of expenditure must satisfy the following condition:
œ EC,t
EC,t
= rt − θ. (5)
The necessary condition for the time path of Ct can be readily obtained from
condition (5) and price formula (2).
2.1.2 The intratemporal problem of choosing X and Y
Given the time path of total expenditure in (5), consumers allocate this ex-
penditure in every period between good Y and a bundle of hi-tech goods X,
given the prices PY and PX. The demand functions follow from the necessary








112.1.3 The intratemporal problem of choosing xi
Consumers allocate the optimal expenditure on X type goods, EX = PXX, from
(6) among individual varieties facing prices {pi}N
i=1. The symmetric demand















,i =1 ,...,N. (7)
Demand functions de￿ned as such (i.e. {xi}N
i=1 in terms of {pi}N
i=1)a p p e a r
natural if ￿rms choose prices when maximising their pro￿ts. If, on the other
hand, ￿rms choose quantities, the demand system (7) is better thought of as
de￿ning {pi}N
i=1 in terms of {xi}N












This completes the description of households behaviour.
2.2 Y good ￿rms
We assume an in￿nite number of competitive ￿rms producing a traditional good4
using CRS technology with the unitary unit labour requirements:
Y = LY , (9)
where LY is the number of people employed in the traditional sector. Because
of perfect competition, traditional ￿rms will not generate any surplus over their
labour cost, but will follow marginal cost pricing:
4In the original paper, this sector is described as having exhausted its learning opportuni-
ties.
12PY = w,
where w is the nominal wage rate prevailing in the economy. Since only real
variables can be determined in the equilibrium, we later normalise w =1by a
choice of units.
2.3 X good ￿rms
Each variety is produced using IRS technology with a ￿xed ￿ow of labour, f,
necessary to maintain production, and eﬃciency depending on the accumulated
level of ￿rm-speci￿ck n o w l e d g e :
xi = hiLXi. (10)
Lxi i st h en u m b e ro fp e o p l ee m p l o y e di n￿rm i in the production itself (i.e.
manufacturers), and hi is the level of ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge that accumulates
according to:
œ hi = γh
1−α
i HαLIi, (11)
where LIi is the number of employees in ￿rm i involved in innovative R&D,
which improves the productivity of the workforce in production, and H is the
industry average level of knowledge across ￿rms5. Hence, the total amount of
labour employed by a ￿rm is:
5The speci￿cation in (11) asserts that research productivity depends on the ratio of a ￿rm-
speci￿c level of knowledge to an industry average, rather than on an industry-wide stock of
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, is independent of
13f + LXi + LIi.
Research activity bene￿ts from its own research base hi and spill-overs from
an average level of knowledge in industry H with diminishing returns to both.
We also assume that each variety is produced by a single ￿rm and vice versa. It
will be clear from the equilibrium below that no ￿rm would ￿nd it optimal to
produce a variety already produced by another company, if it can enter its own
pro￿table niche. Because we only analyse symmetric equilibria along the BGP,
we assume that all ￿rms start with the same level of ￿rm-speci￿ck n o w l e d g e .
At every instant, each ￿rm chooses a price ( pi,s) or quantity (xi,s) for its
production and the amount of labour devoted to research so as to maximise
its net present value, not taking into account the eﬀects of its actions on the
knowledge accumulation of other ￿rms. Under this assumption, we con￿ne
ourselves to strategic interactions at the level of the production/pricing decisions
of ￿rms for the bene￿t of standard dynamic optimisation techniques, unlike the
diﬀerential game approach. These strategic interactions take place in two modes
of competition: Bertrand (￿rms compete in prices), and Cournot (￿rms compete
in quantities). According to the mode, ￿rms solve one of the following problems:
V B










the number of competing hi-tech ￿rms. For this reason, the speci￿cation precludes analysing
the eﬀects which a varying number of competing ￿rms might have on the possibility of inter
￿rm learning. See, for instance, Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) for these types of eﬀects.
14...[xi,spi,s − ws(f + LXi,s + LIi,s)]ds (13)
s.t. (7), (10), (11),i =1 ,...,N.,o r
V C









rτdτ [xi,spi,s − ws(f + LXi,s + LIi,s)]ds,
s.t.(8), (11),(10), i =1 ,...,N.
Because the choice of price (or quantity) has no dynamic eﬀect between
periods, each ￿rm￿s actions at every instant can be thought of as taking place
in two stages: In the second stage, the ￿rm chooses its price (or quantity) given
t h ep a t ho fi t sr e s e a r c hb a s ehi,t and the input to research process Li,t chosen
in the ￿rst stage. In the ￿rst stage, the ￿rm chooses the optimal time path of
the research base by allocating labour to research, and envisaging the outcomes











i (h) − wLIi,s
i
ds, (14)
s.t. 11,i =1 ,...,N.,l = C,B
e V B
i =m a x
pi
{xi,spi,s−ws(f + LXi,s)| s.t.(7),(10),h} (15)
e V C
i =m a x
xi
{xi,spi,s−ws(f + LXi,s)| s.t.(8),(10),h}, (16)
where h ={hi}
N
i=1 denotes a vector of knowledge stocks for all hi-tech ￿rms.
This decomposition allows us to solve the two problems separately in stages.
152.3.1 The intratemporal problem








where e is the perceived price elasticity of output for ￿rm i. The higher the
perceived elasticity is, the lower the mark-up and pro￿ts are at every moment,
ceteris paribus. In our context, the elasticity depends on the mode of competi-
tion. It can be shown that for the Bertrand case:
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Later we will be concerned only with analysing symmetric equilibria, thus
these elasticities will become independent of choice variables and will be func-
tions of parameters only:
eB = † +
1 − †
N





6It seems worthwhile to emphasise that although both are own price elasticities of demand,
they diﬀer in variables that are kept constant (which are in both cases decision variables of
other ￿rms). For Bertrand they are prices and for Cournot, quantities. Hence, a more precise
general notation might look like:
eB ≡− †(xi;pi | p−i) and eC ≡− †(xi;pi | x−i), where subindex −i denotes a vector of
variables other than i.
16Because of their distinct eﬀects on pricing, pro￿ts and welfare, we interpret,
in line with Sutton (1991), the diﬀerent modes of competition as two extremes
on the scale of toughness of competition7. In the symmetric equilibria studied
later, we will examine the eﬀects of competition severity by simply substituting
eB or eC from (20) in place of e in (17). It is, however, too simplistic to impose
such symmetry on the solution of the second (production) stage before the ￿rst
(intertemporal) stage of problem (14) is solved. This is our point of departure
from the conventional treatment, and from Smulders and van de Klundert￿s in
particular.
The distinction between the two modes of competition is meaningful only
when the number of competing ￿rms is relatively small (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977,
Yang and Heidra,1993); for large N the two coincide. Because diﬀerent strategic
interactions lie at the heart of our interest, implicit in our subsequent analysis
will be the requirement for a small number of hi-tech ￿rms, achieved either by
keeping the ￿x e dc o s to fe n t r y( f) large enough to sustain only a few ￿rms in
a free entry equilibrium, or by preventing free entry and keeping the number of
￿rms exogenously small.
Before symmetry is imposed, the optimal pricing decision for Bertrand com-
petition is given by the system of (17) and (18) for all i =1 ,...,N, while the
optimal quantity decision for Cournot competition is determined by the system
of (8), (17) and (19) for all i =1 ,...,N. Hence for Bertrand, the system de￿nes:
7Sutton, in fact, considers the weakest competition the case of joint pro￿t maximisation.
17pi = pi(h)=pi(hi,h−i), (21)
where h denotes a vector of knowledge stocks for all ￿rms, {hl}
N
l=1 , and h−i
denote a vector of knowledge stocks for all other ￿rms except i. The motivation
for this functional notation is the apparent functional asymmetry of hi and
hj,j6=i in pi given by (17), and the symmetry of hl,l6=i and hk,k6=i given by
(18). The intratemporal operational pro￿ts resulting from this optimisation
















where p−i denotes a price vector of pj6=i
8 and where again we made use of the
functional symmetry in (7). This functional form appears cumbersome, but we
￿nd it useful for intertemporal optimisation later on. In fact, in a symmetric





NeB − wf =
Eσ
†(N − 1) + 1
− wf. (24)
Likewise, for Cournot competition, optimisation de￿nes the system of:
xi = xi(h)=xi(hi,h−i), (25)


















NeC − wf =
Eσ(N + † − 1)
N2†
− wf. (29)
2.3.2 The intertemporal problem
With the intratemporal pro￿ts de￿ned in (26) and (22), we may now characterise
the ￿rst stage of a ￿rm￿s decision making. The ￿rm decides on its investment
in research (LI,i) given the evolution of its knowledge base (11) and facing the
path of interest rates rt and the average level of knowledge in industry Ht.
With respect to the Ht, we assume that the ￿rm is myopic in the sense that
it does not realise the eﬀect it has over the industry average. We assume this
for computational convenience, as it is not central to the argument we pursue
here. As a result, the ￿rm does not consider the eﬀects of its actions on its
rivals￿ pro￿ts that work through knowledge spill-overs, but instead considers















s.t. (11),i =1 ,...,N, k = B,C.












where λi, the co-state variable, is the present shadow value of knowledge base



























On the other hand, the necessary condition describing the ￿rm￿s indiﬀerence
between investing in research or production diﬀers according to competition.








































LIi = −œ λi,
20where time subscripts have been suppressed for notational convenience. ∇xi(p)
denotes the (row) vector of partial derivatives with respect to elements of p,
while
∂p−i(hi,h−i)
∂hi refers to a (column) vector of partial derivatives of elements
of p−i with respect to hi. It is this assumption in the formulation of the ￿rst
order condition where we deviate from the treatment by K-S. They assume that
￿rms do not account for adverse eﬀects of their own R&D choice on other ￿rms￿
behaviour through knowledge spill-overs, which is a standard treatment. In
addition, they impose symmetry on human capital stock across ￿rms before the
decision about R&D is made, and ￿rms treat this path as given in the rational
expectations equilibrium. Hence, the term
∂p−i(hi,h−i)
∂hi is implicitly missing in
their characterisation of the ￿rms￿ behaviour9.
Substituting (31) and (32) and multiplying by hi, we obtain the following










































The expression can be simpli￿ed using the functional symmetry noted above:
9If we extended our analysis to comprise the strategic interactions working through knowl-
edge spill-overs, we would ￿r s th a v et or e c o g n i s et h a tt h el e v e lo f￿rm-speci￿ck n o w l e d g ei s
a function of the other￿s research stock hi (h−i). Then the partial derivative
∂p−i(hi,h−i)
∂hi in
















observe that the second term disappears when we ignore spill-overs (α =0 ). See Appendix 5
for more details.
21all cross price derivatives of demand functions will have the same functional
form, diﬀerent from own price derivative, and all cross knowledge derivatives of
pricing functions will have the same functional form, diﬀerent from own knowl-
edge derivative. In addition, in the symmetric equilibrium analysed below, these
cross derivatives of demand and pricing functions will have the same value.
Therefore, we may consider only two subindexes: i and j a sr e f e r r i n gt oo w n
and cross eﬀects. More formally, h−i = {hl}l6=i and p−i = {pl}l6=i . Thus, index
j simply refers to any other ￿rm except i. This allows us to rewrite the condition















































∂hi refer to partial derivatives with respect to price or
knowledge base of any other ￿rm, evaluated at symmetry. Simplifying and
using the condition for optimal pricing from the second stage in (17), we get:
hi
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We need to evaluate the expressions for the cross price elasticity of demand
in the Bertrand case (i.e. holding prices of others constant), †(xi;pj | p−j),a n d




10. The elasticity can be readily obtained from (7) as †−1
N ,a n d








†(N − 1) + 1
(N − 1)(†N2 − †(N − 1) − 1)
> 0.
By substituting these expressions for (34) and then simplifying, we ￿nd the fol-

























(N − 1)(1 − †)dB + NeB
eBN
.
The behaviour of term AB, which is a function of a number of ￿rms existing
in equilibrium and a degree of substitutability of X varieties, will later prove very
useful when comparing market equilibria to socially optimal outcomes. Finally,
noting that LXi = xi
hi from (10), and making use of (17), we obtain:



















Cournot competition The necessary condition for describing the ￿rm￿s in-
diﬀerence to investing in its knowledge base or production for Cournot compe-
10If we extended the strategic eﬀects to comprise the spill-over channel, the cross derivative
(N − 1)
∂pj(...)













































LIi = −œ λi.





































Again, conventional treatment disregards the role research decisions have on
the production behaviour of rivals. Hence, the term
∂x−i(hi,h−i)
∂hi is missing in
the standard approach (see K-S).
Using the functional symmetry of prices with respect to the rival ￿rms￿ levels
of production, and production with respect to the rivals￿ stock of knowledge we









































where again we employed notational convention of index j denoting any other


































We need to evaluate the expressions for the cross price elasticity of demand
in the Cournot case (i.e. holding quantities of others constant), †(xi;pj | x−j),
and the cross derivative of the quantity function with respect to another￿s knowl-
edge base,
∂xj(h)
∂hi . The elasticity can be readily obtained from (8) as 1−†
†N ,a n d











(N − 1)(† + N − 2)
≥ 0. (38)
Upon using these expressions in (37) and simplifying, we obtain the following
expression as a necessary condition (in a symmetric equilibrium) for intertem-

























(† − 1)(N − 1)dC + †N
†N
.
Finally, noting that LXi = xi
hi from (10) and making use of (17), we obtain:



















We can observe that the intertemporal condition for a ￿rm￿s behaviour,
when Cournot is played at the second stage (39), has the same form as the
condition when Bertrand is played (35) with term AB replaced by AC.T h e s e
terms are diﬀerent functions of the elasticity of substitution † and the number
of ￿rms N. Hence, when the number of ￿r m si sk e p te x o g e n o u s l ys m a l l( w h e n
free entry is prohibited), such a formulation of intertemporal conditions makes
the eﬀects of diﬀerent modes of competition on equilibrium particularly easy
to analyse. The terms can be understood as measures of strategic interactions
linking the decisions about R&D with those about pricing and production. Note
in particular that when ￿rms ignore the eﬀects of their research investment on
the others￿ pricing and quantity decisions (the terms
∂pj(...)
∂hi ,a n d
∂xj(...)
∂hi above
are set to zero), the terms dC and dB are both zero, and AB and AC are equal
to one. In this case, these measures of strategic interactions disappear from the
above conditions and the mode of competition is not important. Similarly, if
the number of ￿rms N reaches in￿nity, both strategic terms converge to unity,
because strategic interactions become unimportant. This is a standard result
(van de Klundert and Smulders, 1997). Note also that the eﬀects of strategic
interactions we consider here do not hinge on the existence of knowledge spill-
overs.
Having characterised the paths of a ￿rm￿s optimal choices, we may also
characterise the ￿rm￿s intertemporal pro￿ts, i.e. the value of a ￿rm in (12) in a




















− wsf − wsLIi,s
‚
ds. (41)
This completes the description of the behaviour of X sector ￿rms and we
move next to characterisation of equilibria.
3 Market Equilibrium
For analytical purposes, we are only interested in symmetric equilibria among
Xs e c t o r￿rms. Hence, all hi-tech ￿rms are identical in equilibrium, producing
the same quantities at identical prices and investing the same resources in the
development of their knowledge bases. This makes an average industry level
of knowledge, H, identical to a representative ￿rm￿s knowledge, h,s i g n i ￿cantly
simplifying the analysis.
Market equilibrium is the combination of all allocations and prices in the
model economy such that the behaviour of all agents is optimal and all markets
clear. The clearance of goods markets has already been ensured by the opti-
mal behaviour of ￿rms. The clearance of bond markets implies that household
savings are used to ￿nance R&D investment:




The intertemporal budget constraint in (3) and (4) can be, after substituting for
the ￿rm￿s pro￿ts (22 and 29) and labour demands (46, 9 and 6), manipulated
27to yield in symmetry:
EC = wN [LX + f]+wLY + Nπ. (42)












The only other market that matters here is the labour market in which all the
workforce must equal the exogenously given supply of labour, L:
L = LY + N(LX + f)+NLI. (46)
Using (45) in labour demand in sector Y given by equations (9) and (6) we ob-





+ NLI = L − Nf.
The symmetric equilibrium with a ￿xed number of X varieties (henceforth





























+ NtLI,t = L − Ntf. (51)
The system de￿nes the evolution of allocations E,h,LI,L X, and prices r,w,
for the given parameters and number of X ￿rms. The ￿rst equation describes
the consumer￿s intertemporal behaviour as in (5). The second is a symmetric
equilibrium version of the technological constraint in (11). The third describes
the optimal behaviour of X sector ￿rms. It is derived from (35) (or 39) by
imposing symmetry and ￿rst substituting LIi by (48) and then
LIi
œ hi/h by 1
γ in the
resulting expression. The last two are products of the asset market and labour
market clearing conditions and were already derived earlier.
In a free entry equilibrium, new X ￿rms enter as long as the intratemporal
pro￿ts are positive, so the number of ￿rms can be pinned down by the following
condition:
V =0 . (52)












− f − LIi,s
¶‚
ds.
The value of a ￿rm on a balanced growth path (BGP) decreases in the num-
b e ro fc o m p e t i n gXs e c t o r￿rms, other things being equal, because the partial
derivative of ∂eB,C
∂N > 0 (see 20). If the number is determined exogenously, the
29v a l u eo fa ni n c u m b e n t￿rm will be non-negative.
Because only relative prices can be solved in the equilibrium, we employ the
normalisation suggested above, namely w = PY =1 , and express all variables
in terms of traditional goods. As usual, we will concentrate on analysing the
system at a balanced growth path (BGP). There are no transitional paths, and
the system, once oﬀ the BGP, immediately jumps back. We are looking for
balanced growth paths with knowledge accumulating at a constant rate g.T h i s
implies that a constant fraction of labour resources is devoted to knowledge
accumulation, and hence also to the production of X goods. Then, total expen-
diture will be constant at the BGP, which can only be if the interest rates are
also constant and equal to the subjective discount rate. Hence, the balanced
growth (constrained) equilibrium is described by the following modi￿cation to
the above diﬀerential system:













+ NLI = L − Nf. (57)
If we allowed a free entry, this system would be accompanied by the free-
entry condition (52) which on the BGP implies:
30Lxi,s
(e − 1)
− f − LIi =0 . (58)
The system can be easily solved for the balanced rate of growth. Solving the
system of (57) and (55) for LI and LX and substituting the resulting expression
for LI in (54) we obtain the following expression for the balanced rate of growth
as a function of parameters and the number of X sector ￿rms:
g(N,e)=
γσ(e − 1)( L
N − f)A − θ(e − σ)
α(e − σ)+Aσ(e − 1)
, (59)
where e and A take the form according to the mode of competition. Examining
the expressions for A oﬀers direct insight into the eﬀects of competition on
growth for a given level of concentration (de￿ned as 1/N). In a free entry
equilibrium (when the level of concentration is endogenous), the reduced form
expression for g and N are diﬃcult to obtain. Nevertheless, it would be bene￿cial
to complement condition (59) with a condition determining the number of ￿rms
in a free entry equilibrium. Substituting the expression obtained above for LX





The system of (59) and (60) determines the equilibrium values of growth
and the number of hi-tech ￿rms along the BGP as functions of the model￿s
parameters.
314T h e e ﬀects of strategic interactions
The constrained rate of growth in condition (59) diﬀers from the conventional
result by featuring strategic terms AC or AB. Speci￿cally, if we were to follow
the K-S analysis to the letter, we would have found the equivalent condition to
be:
g(N,e)=
γσ(e − 1)( L
N − f) − θ(e − σ)
α(e − σ)+σ(e − 1)
.
Regarding terms AC and AB, we have already said informally that their
values indicate a measure of strategic interactions among X sector ￿rms, ap-
proaching unity as the number of ￿rms goes to in￿nity. The appendix 2 pro-
vides further details about the behaviour of these expressions on the domain of
plausible parameter values. The main diﬀerence between the two is that while
AB approaches unity from below, AC does it from above. The second diﬀerence
is that while the partial derivative of AB with respect to N is monotonic, AC
is generally non-monotonic and reaches its maximum at values of N close to 3.
Third, at the limit value N =2 , AB approaches exactly 2/3 as † reaches in￿n-
ity while AC is unity. This ￿nding implies that when there are only two ￿rms
playing Cournot at the second stage, there cannot be any strategic interactions
among them in the ￿rst stage. These only become important at lower levels of
concentration. The reason for this peculiar result is that when there are only
two ￿rms playing Cournot at the second stage, an increase in one￿s production
has no eﬀect on the marginal revenues of the other (see Appendix 2). These
observations are best manifested in Figure 1 depicting the expressions in †,N
32space.
To better understand the mechanisms operating in these strategic variables,
we rewrite them in terms of various elasticities considered throughout the paper.
It can be shown that for Bertrand competition11:
AB =1− (N − 1)
†(xi;pj | p−j)†(pj;hi)
1 − eB . (61)
T h ev a r i a b l ed i ﬀers from 1 by the expression (N − 1)
†(xi;pj|p−j)†(pj|hi)
1−eB > 0.
Consider now the elasticities in the numerator of this expression. They show
the anticipated percentage eﬀect of the R&D investment of a representative ￿rm
i on the contraction of demand for its products through the pricing reaction of
ar i v a l￿rm j. Elasticity †(pj;hi) describes the channel through which the R&D
investment alters optimal pricing by its rivals. Elasticity †(xi;pj | p−j),o nt h e
other hand, shows the response of consumer demand to a pricing reaction of the
rival ￿rm, holding the prices of others constant. It is the ordinary cross price
elasticity of demand for Bertrand competition. As there are N − 1 identical
rival ￿rms in the symmetric equilibrium, the total eﬀect on the demand for
the goods of the investing ￿rm results after multiplying by this number. The
fraction part of the expression has this total eﬀect of R&D investment on the
￿rm￿s own demand expressed relative to the percentage demand eﬀect of the
own price decision (its excess over 1).
In Cournot competition, AC can be rewritten as12:













eB−1 gives us the result.
12Note that from (37) and the subsequent exposition we can write AC as AC =1− (N −
33AC =1+( N − 1)
eC†(pi;xj | x−j)†(xj;hi)
1 − eC . (62)
Although seemingly diﬀerent, the expression by which AC exceeds 1, (N −
1)
eC†(pi;xj|x−j)†(xj|hi)
1−eC > 0, is interpreted identically to the equivalent expression
in the Bertrand case. Elasticity †(xj | hi) comprises the link, in percentage
terms, through which a ￿rm￿s own R&D investment aﬀects the production de-
cision of a representative rival. Elasticities †(pi;xj | x−j)eC then translate this
eﬀect into the impact on consumer demand for the production of the investing
￿rm. We note too that eC ≡− †(xi;pi | x−i). As before, the total eﬀect is
normalised with respect to the percentage demand eﬀect of the ￿rm￿s own price
decision (its excess over 1).
In both cases, therefore, the strategic term A measures the eﬀect of R&D
expenditure on the consumer demand of the investing ￿rm, which can be antic-
ipated from the reaction of its rivals. In Appendix 5, we demonstrate that so
de￿ned strategic expressions and their position in the de￿nition of the equilib-
rium remain intact, even when allowing for the interactions to pass through the
knowledge spill-over channel (although, if expressed in primitive parameters,
the expressions would diﬀer substantially). This is an important result, because
it permits us to think about these expressions as conjectural variables re￿ecting
the ￿anticipated￿ strategic eﬀects of R&D investment. Such an interpretation















eC−1 gives us the result.
345T h e e ﬀects of competition and social optimal-
ity
In order to grasp the implications of diﬀerent modes of competition for balanced
growth rates, we need to analyse the relationship between terms eB and eC,
and between AC and AB. As for the elasticities, the expressions in (20) clearly
show that in a symmetric equilibrium eB >e C. In other words, because the
perceived price elasticity of demand is higher, mark-ups over marginal costs
must be lower under the tougher Bertrand competition. We may then establish
the implications of competition toughness for growth by partially diﬀerentiating











− f)α + θ
‚
≥ 0. (63)
The higher price elasticity perceived under Bertrand competition leads to higher
balanced rates of growth for any given level of concentration and strategic in-
teraction terms13. This is a standard result, analysed, for instance, by van de
Klundert and Smulders: Intuitively, lower prices of hi-tech goods under Bertrand
competition make them relatively cheaper than traditional goods, and so the
market and pro￿ts of hi-tech ￿rms are larger. This increases incentives for re-
search investment. However, the two modes of competition diﬀer not only in
pricing rules, but also in the impacts of strategic interactions, as exempli￿ed
by terms AC and AB. These were missing in original van de Klundert and
13Note that the gradient of AC − AB also contains the diﬀerence between eC and eB,
because in general, A is a function of e. Thus, the partial derivative above, holding A constant,
underestimates the elasticity eﬀect because it ignores the channel that works through strategic
interactions (see below).
35Smulders￿ original exposition.
If we look solely to the implications of the strategic terms, condition (59) sug-
gests that when AB ≤ 1 and AC ≥ 1, the balanced growth rates under Bertrand
competition will probably fall short of Cournot rates for any given degree of con-
centration, N, and perceived price elasticity, e. This intuition is supported by
condition (55), which gives the ratio of resources devoted to research and output
implied by the intertemporal optimisation of ￿rms: for any given combination
of parameters and growth rate, the relative resources devoted to research will
be higher for ￿rms engaged in Cournot, and not Bertrand, competition. To
support this intuition, we diﬀerentiate the expression for constrained balanced
growth (59) with respect to the degree of strategic interactions A, holding the




σ(e − 1)(e − σ)






− f)α + θ
‚
≥ 0. (64)
Indeed, because AC ≥ AB, the constrained balanced growth under Cournot
competition is higher than under Bertrand, for any given level of concentration
(and perceived price elasticity). And, as condition (60) remains unaﬀected by
the mode of competition, this result implies that when ignoring diﬀerent price
14It may seem inconsistent to diﬀerentiate the growth rate with respect to A,w h i l ek e e p i n g
the perceived elasticity constant, when, in fact, it changes across the mode of competitions for
the same parameter values. This is certainly true for the well-speci￿ed strategic game space
considered here. But empirically, it helps to understand the perceived price elasticity e as a
measure of competition toughness, as for instance in Sutton (1991). Under such circumstances,
e may be treated as the primitive parameter of the remaining system, even though it does not
result from a properly de￿ned intratemporal game. The perceived elasticity may function as
an ad hoc conjecture, just as the ￿conjectural variation￿ parameter in the IO literature (see
e.g. Brander, 1995). If we likewise treat A as a primitive conjecture on strategic eﬀects, the
derivative of the growth rate with respect to A, holding e constant, would be meaningful.
In addition, the derivative below examines the eﬀect of including a strategic term in the
conventioanal functional form for the constrained growth rate.
36elasticities in a free entry equilibrium, Cournot growth rate is higher and the
number of hi-tech ￿rms lower than under Bertrand.
This result can be understood as follows. Because the choice variables
(prices) under Bertrand are strategic substitutes, while under Cournot they
(quantities) are complements, a ￿rm￿s rivals react to its lower price by follow-
ing suit. The implication is that by investing in its own R&D, the ￿rm is
able to charge lower prices. This triggers an optimal response from its rivals,
who adjust their prices downward to eliminate the price disadvantage. When
the investing ￿rm takes this into account, its perceived pro￿ts from production
decrease, making the incentive to invest in R&D lower than under Cournot.
Under Cournot, by contrast, rival ￿rms react to a ￿rm￿s increased production
by decreasing their own production. Because investment in research enables
the ￿rm to increase production, the rival ￿rms￿ optimal response is to decrease
their production, which in turn makes the pro￿ts of the investing ￿rm com-
paratively higher. This enhances the bene￿ts of research and leads to a higher
rate of knowledge accumulation. However, note that reallocation of more labour
resources to R&D under Cournot competition actually decreases the life-time
pro￿ts of hi-tech ￿rms (conditions 52 and 58) as compared to the Bertrand case,
so only fewer ￿rms can be supported in a free entry market equilibrium.
The eﬀects of competition toughness and strategic interaction, therefore,
have contrary implications for constrained growth rates under the two modes of
competition. Which of them dominates is diﬃcult to tell in general, but we can
make few observations. For instance, both eﬀects disappear as N →∞ . Note
37also that the eﬀect of tougher competition relies on the presence of traditional
goods. Ignoring the traditional sector (by setting σ =1 ) removes the relative
price distortion, so only strategic interactions remain to distinguish between the
two modes.
In this context, Cournot constrained growth rates exceed those of Bertrand.
As we show in Appendix 3 using numerical simulations, the share of hi-tech
goods in consumption is a critical parameter determining which mode of com-
petition brings about a higher balanced growth rate. We demonstrate, that in
an approximation of the problem, for several levels of concentration there exists
a critical level of this share (￿ σ) for any degree of substitutability among hi-tech
goods (†) above which Cournot growth rates dominate those of Bertrand. This
critical value rises with higher substitutability, making higher Bertrand growth
rates more likely (Figure 2). On the other hand, it falls with a greater number of
competing ￿rms, making higher Bertrand growth rates more unlikely. From our
approximation of the problem, then, it appears that higher constrained growth
rates may be observed under Bertrand competition only at low levels of con-
centration (close to duopoly) when the share of hi-tech goods in consumption
is also relatively low; a constellation that may prove rare in practice.
Although the size of the approximating error remains undetermined, we
can ￿rmly concluded that if the share of goods, for whose production learning
is important, is high enough, the more relaxed Cournot competition yields a
higher balanced growth rate. We could not obtain these kinds of results in a
standard treatment, which ignores the eﬀects of strategic interactions linking
38decisions about R&D with those of pricing and production.
5.1 Social optimality
A detailed solution to the problem of an idealised social planner looking for the
growth rate and the number of ￿rms which would maximise households￿ utility
can be found in Smulders and van de Klundert (1997). There, the socially
optimal balanced rate of growth for a given number of hi-tech ￿rms (i.e. socially
optimal constrained rate of growth) is given as:
g(N,e)=
γσ( L
N − f) − θ
σ
, (65)
and the optimal number of ￿r m si sd e t e r m i n e db y :
g(N,e)=γ(
L σ
N († − 1+σ)
− f). (66)
As the authors note, market equilibrium will in general diﬀer from the so-
cial optimal outcome because of three types of imperfections. First, because
of knowledge spill-overs in investing (α > 0), ￿rms do not appropriate all the
bene￿ts of R&D investment, causing it to be suboptimally low (ceteris paribus).
Second, because of imperfect competition in the X sector, the relative price of
hi-tech versus traditional goods is higher than the marginal rate of technical
substitution, again leading to lower production of hi-tech goods and a lower
rate of innovation. It is easily demonstrated that by removing these distortions
through the elimination of spill-overs (α =0 ), elimination or taxation of the tra-
ditional sector (σ =1or tax to correct for the relative price) and ignorance of
39the strategic terms, condition (59) becomes identical to (65). Then the market
and social rates of growth, conditional on a given rate of concentration, coincide
in the absence of strategic interactions. The third type of distortion involves the
optimal number of ￿rms in a free-entry equilibrium. Because ￿rms base their
pricing on perceived demand elasticities (e)w h i c ha r ed i ﬀerent (for small values
of N) from consumers￿ demand elasticities (†), the ￿rms￿ pro￿ts are too large
and too many ￿rms co-exist in the equilibrium. In addition to the three outlined
by K-S, there is also a forth type of imperfection caused by strategic interactions
when the number of ￿rms is small, and depending on the mode of competition.
Under Cournot, strategic complementariness of production (as the choice vari-
able of ￿rms) motivates further research investment, making it too high from a
social point of view. Under Bertrand, by contrast, the strategic substitutability
of prices decreases the bene￿ts of research, leading to a suboptimally low level
of investment.
As we are primarily interested in the eﬀects of competition on market growth
rates, we dismiss the other imperfections. First, we remove the traditional sector
(σ =1 ), and second, we only work with a ￿x e dn u m b e ro fX - s e c t o r￿rms, thus
avoiding the second and third types of imperfections. The (constrained) market
growth rate is then given by:
g(N,e)=
γ( L
N − f)A − θ
α + A
, (67)




− f) − θ. (68)
Note that when the number of ￿rms goes to in￿nity (strategic interactions
lose importance, A =1 ) and there are no spill-overs (externality disappears, α =
0), the market and social rates of growth coincide. It follows that if we ignore
only strategic interactions (A =1 ), then the market growth rate will always fall
short of the social rate and the spill-over imperfection will never be corrected
without introducing taxes or subsidies. This is the same result obtained by
van de Klundert and Smulders, who ignored the strategic interactions when
investing in R&D. We ￿nd, however, that incorporating these interactions may
trigger their result either way.









and will either exceed the social rate (Cournot) or fall short (Bertrand). That
Cournot delivers too high growth rate is a consequence of strategic interactions
linking decisions about R&D to production, which do not rely on the spill-over
channel. These results thus parallel the discussion in strategic trade literature
(Brander, 1995).
With spill-overs and interactions back in place, the two rates may coincide
under the following condition for A:








Because AB ≤ 1, it follows that Bertrand balanced growth rates will al-
ways fall short of socially optimal (constrained) growth rates, for any degree of
concentration. This is easily understood, since in this case both the spill-over
externality and strategic substitutability of prices decrease research investment.
In addition, the rate of knowledge accumulation will be lower than what is im-
plied by van de Klundert and Smulders. But for Cournot competition, AC ≥ 1
and hence the socially (constrained) optimal rate of growth may in principle
be attained. The reason is that this time, spill-over externality works against
the strategic complementariness of production in the ￿nal eﬀect on knowledge
accumulation. In this vein, strategic interactions may act as a device that re-
moves the imperfection caused by the inappropriability of research spill-overs.
This eﬀect could not be obtained in the original Smuldert and van de Klundert
treatment. Formally, the condition for N under which the market and social
constrained rates of growth coincide is:
(† − 1)(N − 2)





This condition gives a cubic equation in N which is non-trivial to analyse
explicitly. Nevertheless, we show in Appendix 4 that when restricting ourselves
to values of N greater than or equal to 2, we may have only one or no solution
satisfying the above condition. Figures in the Appendix suggest where such
42a solution may lie. There we also ￿nd that for the coincidence of social and
market constrained growth rates on this domain, hi-tech goods must be good
enough substitutes. Under this condition, the socially optimal rate of growth
may be attained even at fairly high levels of concentration, without imposing
taxation on the traditional sector.
6 Concentration and growth
The preceding analysis enables us to draw a qualitative conclusion about the re-
lationship between concentration and growth. While ordinarily (ignoring strate-
gic interactions), one would expect balanced growth rates to fall with lower
concentration because lower market power reduces pro￿ts from innovation, this
may not be the case when the number of ￿r m si ss m a l la n dt h es t r a t e g i ci n -
teractions among them are important. The reason is that diﬀerent levels of
concentration alter the growth implications of strategic interactions. The total
eﬀect of a change in the market growth rate when the number of ￿rms increases
may thus be decomposed into two eﬀects: a fall in market power and a change












The ￿rst term, attributable to a fall in market power, is always nega-
tive15. The second re￿ects a change in the growth eﬀect of strategic inter-
15In fact, this ￿rst element comprises two eﬀects: a fall in market power (negative sign) and
a decline in the hi-tech sector relative to the traditional one (positive sign). It is easy to see,
though, that the former always dominates the latter for any level of concentration. However,
this would not need to be the case if productivity in a ￿rm￿s R&D sector depended on an
industry-wide stock of knowledge capital rather than on an industry average as in the present
43actions. We know from (64) that
∂g(N,A)
∂A is always positive and that the sign of
∂A(N)
∂N depends on the mode of competition. Because for Bertrand competition
∂AB(N)
∂N > 0,t h eo v e r a l le ﬀect on growth is ambiguous. Nonetheless, as is shown
in Appendix 2,
∂AB(N)
∂N falls rapidly towards zero, much faster than
∂g(N,A)
∂N .
We thus draw a qualitative conclusion that at lower levels of concentration, the
market growth rate probably falls with a rising number of ￿rms. The speed of
this fall is however slower than predicted under a conventional market power
analysis, and at lower levels of concentration this relationship may even break
down.
Only marginally more precise conclusions can be made for Cournot compe-
tition. We show in Appendix 2 that
∂AC(N)
∂N < 0 for N ≥ ￿ N =2+
√
2†.O nt h i s
interval
∂g(N)
∂N < 0, that is, the market growth rate falls with a rising number
of ￿rms. But this time, the speed of the fall is faster than predicted under









∂N is positive, and again the total eﬀect is ambiguous. In
spite of this, we may still conclude that if the balanced growth rates rise at all
with lower concentration, then it can only be at very high concentration levels
close to duopoly. This unconventional result arises from the consideration of
strategic eﬀects.
c a s e .I ns u c has e t t i n gw i t hf e w e r￿rms, possibilities of inter-￿rm learning diminish, impacting
negatively on growth. This eﬀect is sometimes called the public knowledge eﬀect. Smulders
and van de Klundert (1995) show that this eﬀect is likely to overturn the sign of the ￿rst
element in expression (71) at high levels of concentration. Hence, the public knowledge eﬀect
may also cause a non-monotonic relationship between levels of concentration and growth.
However, this eﬀect is absolutely distinct from the eﬀects of strategic impacts shown below,
even though they too may lead to non-monotonicity in the relationship between concentration
and growth.
447C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we focused on the implications of strategic interactions among hi-
tech ￿r m so nt h er a t e so fg r o w t hw h e nt h en u m b e ro fc o m p e t i n g￿rms is small
and ￿rms recognise the eﬀects their investment decisions have on the production
behaviour of their rivals. Like other results, we ￿nd that a mode of oligopolist
competition can substantially aﬀect rates of growth, but we present novel chan-
nels for these eﬀects. These channels show that less severe Cournot competition
delivers rates of growth higher than socially optimal if knowledge spill-overs are
absent, although in their presence, the result depends upon parameterisation
and the two rates may coincide. On the other hand, a social optimum can never
be achieved under the more severe Bertrand competition, where subsidies re-
main the only means of restoring social optimality. These ￿ndings are parallel
to the conclusions in the strategic trade literature. There the standard result
is that ￿rms tend to under-invest from the social (cost minimising) perspective
in Bertrand and over-invest in Cournot competition (Brander, 1995). Our re-
sults demonstrate that conclusions from the strategic trade literature are robust
enough if extended into an explicitly dynamic general equilibrium framework.
More importantly, though, our results make it evident that questions of opti-
mal policy design related to organisational structure and strategic conduct are
tractable in the framework of endogenous growth models in suﬃcient detail.
As is standard in the literature, we con￿rmed that modes of competition can
have opposite eﬀects on balanced growth rates, depending on whether choice
variables in this competition are strategic substitutes (price competition) or
45complements (quantity competition). Unlike standard results that stress the
positive eﬀect of tougher Bertrand competition on growth, we ￿nd ambiguous
results depending upon parameterisation, which seems to favour Cournot com-
petition. In particular, if the consumption share of goods, for whose production
learning is important, is high enough, the less severe Cournot competition brings
about higher growth rates because the pro-growth eﬀect of strategic interactions
dominates the traditional competitiveness eﬀect. These interactions imply that
￿rms engaged in price competition face lower returns from their R&D invest-
ment than do ￿rms engaged in quantity competition, and hence invest less,
because they correctly anticipate that rivals will react to their investment by
lowering prices. On the other hand, a ￿rm engaged in quantity competition
anticipates that its rivals will lower production in response to its investment;
this increases the perceived pro￿ts from R&D.
While the relation of growth rates under the two modes of competition is
ambiguous, their relation to (constrained) socially optimal rates of growth is
not. In particular, we found that Bertrand balanced growth rates will fall short
of socially optimal (constrained) growth rates for any degree of concentration.
The reason is that, in the case of price competition, both the spill-over ex-
ternality and strategic substitutability of prices decrease research investment.
By contrast, for quantity competition the socially (constrained) optimal rate
of growth may in principle be attained. This time, the spill-over externality
goes against the strategic complementariness of production in the ￿nal eﬀect
on knowledge accumulation. In this vein, strategic interactions may serve as a
46device that removes the imperfection caused by the inappropriability of research
spill-overs. The directions and sizes of these eﬀects could not be obtained in
the original Smulders and van de Klundert treatment. We also showed that in
the absence of knowledge spill-overs, Cournot competition will always deliver
excessively high growth rates.
Unfortunately, we were not able to say much about the relationship between
levels of concentration and market growth rates. Although we could not estab-
lish the standard result that growth rates will fall with a lower concentration,
we were able to do so for Cournot competition at low enough concentration
levels. Still, a reverse result remains possible for both Bertrand and Cournot
competition at high levels of concentration close to duopoly.
It should be noted that most of the eﬀects we consider disappear with a large
number of ￿rms. Likewise, some of the results must be modi￿ed if we consider
free-entry into the hi-tech industry. Nevertheless, we argue that in practice
the barriers to entering such industries are very high and often fall under state
regulation, e.g. by way of licensing. We believe that these circumstances keep
the number of incumbent hi-tech ￿rms small enough for the eﬀects we describe
to be of realistic magnitudes.
In matters of policy, our results suggest that when the number of ￿rms in the
hi-tech industry is in￿uenced by government policy and ￿rms engage in relatively
mild competition (as identi￿ed by the size of mark-ups), a policy that aims at
creating more competition in order to bolster growth may in fact be counter-
productive. This concern relates to policies that attempt to facilitate entry into
47industry as well as other measures focused on lowering mark-ups. However,
licensing, which restricts the number of competing ￿rms to low numbers, may
bring about higher and even socially optimal rates of growth. Our analysis
implies that taxation of the traditional sector (or alternatively subsidies, to
research) as a means of restoring (constrained) social optimality may not be
necessary; in fact, the direct opposite may happen.
Still many important issues remain unresolved. Although our treatment of
strategic interactions is not exhaustive, we do ￿nd the diﬀerential game approach
too complicated to oﬀer any practical policy suggestions. We feel that more
insight could be gained by partially relaxing the assumption that knowledge
spill-overs are completely unintentional, while still keeping the analysis tractable
along the lines of this paper. In a companion paper, we head in this direction
by assuming that the capacity of a rival ￿rm to absorb the results of the rival￿s
research is endogenous to the proportion of the resources allocated to research.
Further, it seems to us that the framework introduced in this paper could be
successfully applied in an international setting to address issues of optimal policy
design among exporting or importing companies. The seminal papers on trade
and growth (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1990a,b) introduce endogenous
growth models into an international setting under very restrictive assumptions
that prevent the analysis of more subtle issues underpinning growth and devel-
opment. In particular, the propagation of technological change across nations
was often modelled on an ad hoc basis or was simply given exogenously. Under
such conditions, room for analysing the strategic eﬀects of various policy tools
48such as tariﬀ barriers or quantitative protection is con￿ned, and the analysis
remains almost exclusively in the domain of strategic trade literature. Our be-
lief that the approach of this paper could help tackle these issues is especially
motivated by the close resemblance of our present results to those of strategic
trade literature.
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We need to evaluate the expression
∂pj(hj,h−j)
∂hi from (34). Note that pi = pi(h)=
pi(hi,h−i) is de￿ned in (21) as the result of the second stage competition in








c(hi)=0 ,∀i =1 ,...,N, (72)
where Ri(p) is the current revenue function of ￿rm i, i.e. Ri(p)=pixi(p),
and c(hi) is the marginal cost function, de￿ned for this problem as c(hi)= w
hi.
With this implicit system, we may compute the derivative
∂pj(hj,h−j)
∂hi .U s i n g











































































However, because we focus on symmetric equilibria, the functional symmetry of
demand with respect to rival ￿rms￿ prices (noted in the main text) enables us
to distinguish only own and cross price derivatives. Denoting i as any ￿rm and





a b ... b
b a ... b
... ... ... ...
























This form of matrix A is particularly useful, since its determinant can be





∂hj . Hence, in system (73) we may
denote the ￿rst row as corresponding to the ith ￿rm and the last row as corre-
sponding to the jth ￿r m . T h i sa l l o w su st os t u d yt h ee ﬀe c t so fav a r i a t i o ni n
hj on pi u s i n gam o d i ￿ed system:
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a. . . b
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where N denotes the number of rows in matrix A (equal to the number of
￿rms). Substituting for a and b from above and for pi from (17), we receive











dB = eB (†N +1− †)(† − 1)
N[eB(†(N − 1) + 1 + N)+2 ( †(1 − N) − 1)]
...
[N(† − eB) + 2(1 − †)]
[eB(†(1 − 2N) − 1) + †2(N − 2) + †(N +2 ) ]
.
If we now substitute expression (20) for the perceived price elasticity for
Bertrand competition, we obtain the expression that appears in the main text.
dB =
†(N − 1) + 1
(N − 1)(†N2 − †(N − 1) − 1)
> 0.
A.1.2 Cournot competition
We need to evaluate the expression
∂xj(h)
∂hi from (73). Note that xi = xi(h)=
xi(hi,h−i) is de￿ned in (21) as the result of second stage competition in quan-
tities. This relationship is a reduced form product of the system of F.O.C.s for
this problem:
16Details about the computation of matrix determinants involved in Crammer￿s rule can be




− c(hi)=0 ,∀i =1 ,...,N, (76)
where Ri(x) is the current revenue function of ￿rm i, i.e. Ri(x)=pi(x)xi,a n d
c(hi) is the marginal cost function, de￿ned for this problem as c(hi)= w
hi. With
this implicit system, we may compute the derivative
∂xj(h)
∂hi . Using the implicit


































































However, because we are interested in symmetric equilibria, the functional
symmetry of demand with respect to the rival ￿rm￿s prices (noted in the main
text) enables us to distinguish only own and cross price derivatives. Denoting i
as any ￿rm and j as any ￿rm other than i, we may therefore rewrite this matrix





a b ... b
b a ... b
... ... ... ...





























∂hj . Hence, in system (77) we may denote the ￿rst row as
corresponding to the ith ￿rm and the last row as corresponding to the jth ￿rm.































a +( N − 2)b
a2 +( N − 2)ba − (N − 1)b2c0(hj),
where N denotes the number of rows in the matrix (equal to the number of
￿rms). Substituting for a and b from above and computing the partial deriva-














(N − 1)(† + N − 2)
≥ 0.
A.2 Appendix 2






†N2−†(N−1)−1 make it diﬃcult to analyse their behaviour
on a particular domain of interest, i.e. †>1 and N ≥ 2. Hence, we rely on
numerical simulations, shown in Figure 1, in order to support our intuition.
First, it is immediately seen that AC(N,†) > 1 >A B(N,†) on this parameter
space. Second, the limit of these expressions for N →∞is indeed 1, for every
17Details about the computation of matrix determinants involved in Crammer￿s rule can be
obtained from the author upon request.
55†. Similarly, the behaviour of the expressions at the boundary value of N =2
can be readily established: AC(N =2 ,†)=1 ,lim†→∞ AB(N =2 ,†)=2 /3.
However, the behaviour inside the domain is quite diﬀerent: while AB(N,†) is
monotonic with respect to N (for a given †), AC(N,†) generally is not, as the




†(† − 1)(2N − 1)




(† − 1)(−N2 +4 N +2 † − 4)
N2(† + N − 2)2 .
From inspecting the latter expression, we can establish that AC(N,†) falls
in N for N larger or equal to a critical value ￿ N =2+
√
2†, which is obtained
by setting the partial derivative to zero and ignoring the irrelevant part of the
solution. We may infer, then, that the strategic term AC(N,†) reaches its
maximum at values of N larger but relatively close to 3. Indeed, Figure 1
demonstrates that for plausible values of † the strategic interactions have their
greatest impact at relatively high levels of concentration. On the other hand,
they have no impact with duopoly or when the number of ￿rms is in￿nitely
large.
A.3 Appendix 3
A direct comparison of growth rates under the two modes of competition is
cumbersome, so to better probe the eﬀect of competition on constrained growth
rates, we must weigh the two opposite eﬀects (toughness of competition and
strategic interactions) in expressions (63) and (64) in a particular way. We
56choose a ￿rst order Taylor approximation as one possibility, assuming that it
can give us reasonable intuition as long as the rates under the two modes of
competition are not too far apart. Our basic function to be approximated is the
general function for a constrained growth rate in (59):
g(l)=
γσ(el − 1)( L
N − f)Al − θ(el − σ)
α(el − σ)+Aσ(el − 1)
,l= B,C. (78)
Because evaluation of this function at the two points representing Bertrand
and Cournot modes of competition makes comparison diﬃcult, we approximate
the growth rate for Bertrand at the point of Cournot. In other words, we
approximate the value of g(B) as the ￿rst order Taylor expansion of g(l)a t
l = C. Then we obtain for the approximate diﬀerence between the two rates as:
g(C) − g(B) ’
∂gC(N,e,A)
∂A
(AC − AB) −
∂gC(N,e,A)
∂e
(eB − eC). (79)
The ￿rst term corresponds to the impact of strategic eﬀects (making Cournot
growth rates higher), while the second re￿ects the toughness of the competition
eﬀect (favouring Bertrand). The diﬀerences between the strategic variables
AC−AB and perceived price elasticities eB−eC thus provide reasonable weights
for the two opposite eﬀects. Substituting for the partial derivatives from (63)
and (64), we obtain:
g(C) − g(B) ’
γα( L
N − f)+θ
(α(eC − σ)+ACσ(eC − 1))
2σ
•
(eC − 1)(eC − σ)(AC − AB)
−AC(1 − σ)(eB − eC)
‚
.
57Let￿s denote the term inside the square brackets as Z. The sign of this term,
which is a nontrivial function of two model parameters (†,σ) and a number
of ￿rms N, determines the relationship between g(C) and g(B), because the
preceding terms are assumed to be positive. The parameter upon which the
relationship is likely to depend is the share of hi-tech goods in consumption σ.
We thus compute the critical value of σ at which the expression equals zero:
e σ =
AC(eB − eC) − (eC − 1)eC(AC − AB)
AC(eB − eC) − (eC − 1)(AC − AB)
.
As long as e σ ≤ 1, we can expect Cournot competition to yield higher rates
of growth for any σ > e σ, because we know that for σ =1 , it is always so.
Because e σ is a function of † and N only, we may study its behaviour along these
two dimensions. It is possible to show that the critical value rises with both
the elasticity of substitution (and approaches unity for large †) and the level of
concentration (approaches minus in￿nity for large N) in our domain of interest.
These properties are demonstrated with the help of numerical simulations in
Figure 2. The behaviour of † is intuitive, because almost perfect substitutability
reduces the scope for strategic concentration, favouring Bertrand growth rates.
Not so straightforward is the behaviour of e σ with respect to N. It appears
from Figure 2 that e σ not only falls in N, but does so very rapidly. Interestingly,
at lower levels of concentration we observe that Cournot competition delivers
higher constrained rates of growth, almost irrespective of the degree of substi-
tutability. This is unusual, since one might expect that at high levels of con-
centration where the strategic interactions are unimportant, the eﬀect of lower
monopoly power under Bertrand would dominate. Yet, it turns out that the
58diﬀerence between the perceived price elasticities (eB −eC =
(†−1)2(N−1)
N(N+†−1) ) van-
ishes with higher N even more rapidly than the diﬀerence between the strategic




From the graphs in Figure 2, it becomes apparent that diﬀerentiability is
important for determining e σ only at concentrations close to duopoly. For realis-
tically diﬀerentiated markets (with values of † up to 5), competition of as few as
5 companies and a relatively low share of diﬀerentiated goods in consumption
are required for dominating Bertrand growth rates.
A.4 Appendix 4
In this appendix, we provide further information about the coincidence of the
market and social constrained equilibria under Cournot competition. The level
of concentration at which this coincidence occurs is given by condition (70):
(† − 1)(N − 2)





Instead of solving this cubic equation in N, we characterise the solution
indirectly, using mainly graphical tools. We denote the LHS of the condition












Because we want to place some restrictions on the model parameters, we
choose the substitutions of a and b for the various model parameters in order
59to characterise these restrictions in a parsimonious way. Even though a and
b contain some common elements, there are always enough free parameters to
think of them as independent. The most obvious restriction that we can place
on model parameters is the requirement that gSP(N) be positive for reason-
able levels of concentration. This requirement stems from the observation that
market long-run growth rates are typically positive and that socially optimal
growth rates tend to exceed market ones. For our new parametrisation, this
implies a
b >N , for a range of N where we ￿nd such a restriction reasonable.
Because of the linearity of this relationship, as N increases from 2 or 3, the
value of b quickly becomes unimportant in relation to a. This allows us, at least






Unlike the original condition in (70), this equation can be solved relatively easily
for a single solution:
N =2+
a†
† − 1 − a
.
The solution exists on the plausible domain of N ≥ 2 only under speci￿c
circumstances, namely for high † and low a, making the coincidence of social
and marker equilibria fairly unlikely. In other words, a social optimum will be
attained only if hi-tech goods are suﬃciently good substitutes († ≥ 1+a),w h i c h
is quite reasonable. Because these conclusions hold only in approximation ig-
60noring term b in (81), we support our intuition through a graphic representation
of condition (82) in Figure 3. There we plot separately the left- and right-hand
sides of the condition as functions of N for several parameter values of †,a n da.
Apparently, the non-monotonic plots of G(N) scale upward for larger †, while
hyperbolic plots of a/N s c a l ed o w n w a r dw i t hl o w e ra. The coincidence of mar-
ket and social constrained rates of growth arise where the two types of curves
intersect. From the ￿gure, we observe that for any given a, the two curves
will always intersect for † high enough. Because b is the long-run limit of the
right-hand side expression in (81) as N →∞ , its inclusion would shift the corre-
sponding hyperbolic curve down in Figure 3, lowering N where the coincidence
may occur.
A.5 Appendix 5
In this appendix we show how the results in the main text would change if
we considered strategic interactions based on the existence of knowledge spill-
overs. This channel rests on the recognition that a ￿rm￿s stock of ￿rm speci￿c
knowledge is in fact dependent on the knowledge stock accumulated by each of




N . The inclusion of this strategic channel would call for a more




∂hi = −œ λi characterising the intertemporal
allocation of resources between research and production within hi-tech ￿rms.
We will therefore investigate the necessary modi￿cations of this condition for
each competition mode.
61A.5.1 Bertrand competition




















































instead of (1 − α).The diﬀerence is the
extra eﬀect of a ￿rm￿s own R&D investment on the speed of R&D accumulation
through its impact on the industry average. The extra eﬀect is, however, of the
third order, even at high levels of concentration, provided the extent of spill-
overs (α) remains reasonably small. As the growth engine of this model rests
on accumulation of ￿rm speci￿c knowledge, we assume α to be small enough
to ignore α2
N term. This assumption lets us preserve all other computations
performed in the main text save those leading up to conditions (35) or (39)
which we compute below.
As a second modi￿cation of condition (33), the vector of partial derivatives
∂p−i(hi,h−i)
∂dhi featured in (33) has been replaced by the corresponding vector of
total derivatives
dp−i(hi,h−i)
dhi , because each element of vector h−i is a function












62where the matrix of gradients ∇p−i(h−i) contains only derivatives of pricing
functions with respect to elements of the vector h−i. Consider now a represen-





































In deriving the second and third equalities, we have made use of the fact
that pi(hi,h−i) is functionally symmetric with respect to the rivals￿ stocks of







functionally identical and in a symmetric equilibrium would take on the same































We do observe that in the absence of spill-overs (α =0 ), the vectors of
partial and total derivatives in conditions (33) and (83) coincide. It is also
apparent that all rows of gradient ∇p−i(h−i) have the same functional form,
and in the symmetry would be identical. As a corollary, all elements of vector
dp−i(hi,h−i)
dhi in (83) share the same functional form as well, so in a symmetric
equilibrium would all have the same value. This enables us to treat the vector
63in our subsequent analysis in the same way as we did with vector
∂p−i(hi,h−i)
∂hi
in the main text.
Following the line of argument after condition (33) in the main text, we may
simplify condition (83) to obtain the equivalent of (34):
hi
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The only element that needs evaluating is total derivative
dpj(hj,h−j)
dhi given
in (84). To better understand its meaning, we should recall that it represents
two channels of strategic interactions. One works through the direct link be-
tween investment decisions in the ￿rst stage of the game and pricing decisions
of rival ￿r m si nt h es e c o n d . T h i s ,a sw e l la s( 3 3 )i se x e m p l i ￿ed by derivative
∂pj6=i(hi,h−i)
∂hi . From the analysis above we know that the eﬀect is negative: in-
vestment in R&D enables lower prices, which triggers a similar reaction of the
rival ￿rms. The other channel works indirectly through the impact of R&D
investment on the cost (and so pricing) decisions of the rival ￿rms. It has two
components. First, on the impact, R&D investment of a representative ￿rm low-
ers the cost functions of the rival ￿rms, who can then charge lower prices as well,





negative and is evaluated in Appendix 6. Second, the possibility of lower prices
enabled by the lower industry-wide costs triggers a corresponding strategic price
response from all the ￿rms before a new static equilibrium is reached. This is
64term
∂pj6=i(hi,h−i)
∂hi (N −2) α
N, which is also negative. By including the knowledge
spill-over channel, total derivative
dpj6=i(hi,h−i(h))
dhi unambiguously exceeds in ab-
solute value the partial derivative
∂pj6=i(hi,h−i)
∂hi considered in the analysis of the
main text. As a consequence, the inclusion of this channel increases the impact
of strategic interaction on the decisions of investing ￿rms.
Since
∂pj6=i(hi,h−i)
∂hi has already been evaluated in Appendix 1, the last el-
ement to examine is
∂pj6=i(h−i)
∂hj . In Appendix 6, we show that
∂pj6=i(h−i)
∂hj =
c0(hi)GB, where GB is a function of the primitive parameters of the model.
Because
∂pj6=i(h−i)
∂hj has the same form as
∂pj6=i(hi,h−i)
∂hi = c0(hi)dB, we can ma-
nipulate (85) in much the same way as (34) in the main text to arrive at the
analogue of (35):



















Although both expressions look equivalent, term AB is a diﬀerent function
of primitive parameters than the same term in (35). This notwithstanding, this
term has an indentical economic interpretation as a measure of the extent of
strategic interactions. It quanti￿es the perceived impact of R&D investment on
consumer demand for the production of the investing ￿rm, which arises from
the price reaction of its rivals. To see this, note that following the computation
which leads to the formulation of (61) we arrive at the following expression for
AB :
AB =1− (N − 1)
†(xi;pj | p−j)†(pj;hi)
1 − eB ,








pj previously. The ab-
65solute value of this elasticity is higher than before, because the perceived eﬀects
of R&D investment on the pricing decisions of the rival ￿rms include the ad-
ditional spill-over channel. As a consequence, AB will diﬀer from 1 by more
than the same expression considered in the main text (for any given combina-
tion of parameters), and thus its impact will be larger. All other analyses of
the main text, including the characterisation of the equilibrium and expressions
for the constrained growth rate, remain intact. Qualitative conclusions for the
Bertrand competition too remain unaﬀected.
A.5.2 Cournot competition
We will follow the argumentation in the preceding subsection, and leave out most































LIi = −œ λi,





and the eﬀect of R&D investment on the speed of the ￿rm￿s own knowledge


































where the symmetry in functions and values of the symmetric equilibrium is
employed. As in the Bertrand case, the total and partial derivatives of the main
text would coincide in the absence of spill-overs.
Following the arguments that led to condition (37) we obtain its analogue:
hixi(h)
￿






























The only element of
dxj(h)






pidC is evaluated in Appendix




where GC is a function of model parameters only. We observe that this term
has the opposite sign from
∂xj(hi,h−i(h))
∂hi . To appreciate the implications of this
￿nding we should recall the two channels of strategic interactions present in
dxj(h)
dhi . One is the direct link between investment decisions in the ￿rst stage
of the game and production decisions of rival ￿rms in the second. In (87), as
well as in the main text, this link is represented by derivative
∂xj(hi,h−i(h))
∂hi .
From the analysis above we know that the eﬀect is negative: investment in
R&D enables lower prices, which triggers a corresponding reaction of the rival
￿rms to produce less. The other channel works indirectly through the impact
of R&D investment on the cost (and pricing decisions) of the rival ￿rms. It
67has two components. First, on the impact, R&D investment of a representative
￿rm lowers cost functions of the rival ￿rms, which enables them to produce




N, which is positive and thus
works against the eﬀect of the ￿rst strategic channel considered in the main
text. However, the possibility of higher production (and lower prices), enabled
by the lower industry-wide costs, triggers a corresponding strategic response
from all the ￿rms who contract their production before a new static equilibrium
is reached. This is term
∂xj(hi,h−i(h))
∂hi (N −2) α
N, which is negative. By including
the knowledge spill-over channel in Cournot competition, then, the relation of
total derivative
dxj(h)
dhi to the partial one
∂xj(h)
∂hj is ambiguous. This stands
in contrast to the results for Bertrand competition, where the inclusion of this
channel strengthened the original results. It still seems fair to conclude, however,
that for numbers of ￿rms exceeding 3, even the spill-over channel would likely
deliver negative eﬀects and the original results are strengthened.






dhi are similar, we can work with
dxj(h)
dhi i nm u c ht h es a m ew a ya sw ed i d
with
∂xj(h)
∂hi . Working along the lines of the main text we observe that condition
(39), as well as all other equations in the main text, remain intact:



















Although term AC will be a diﬀerent function of model parameters than the
same term in the main text, its interpretation is the same. Like in the Bertrand
case, the term measures the perceived impact of R&D investment on consumer
68demand for the products of the investing ￿rm arising from the price reaction
of its rivals. To see this, note that following the computation that lead to the
formulation of (62), we arrive at the following expression for AC :
AC =1+( N − 1)
eC†(pi;xj | x−j)†(xj;hi)









xj in the main text. The general relation
of this newly de￿ned elasticity to its original counterpart is diﬃcult to tell. It
seems likely, however, that at low levels of concentration it would exceed the
original one. This would enlarge the discrepancy between AC and 1 (for any
given combination of parameters) and strengthen the signi￿cance of strategic
eﬀects in the analysis of the main text.
A.6 Appendix 6
In this appendix we evaluate the own partial derivatives of choice variable func-




∂hj , as functions of
model parameters. The procedure for their evaluation is identical to that eval-
uating the corresponding cross derivatives in Appendix 1. For this reason, we
leave out the discussion and concentrate on the results only.
A.6.1 Bertrand competition
The derivative of price function with respect to a ￿rm￿s own R&D investment





















69where matrix A has been de￿ned in the Bertrand part of Appendix 1. Invoking





(†N +1− †)(†N2 − 2†(N − 1) + N − 2)
(N − 1)(† − 1)(†N(N − 1) + † − 1)
.
A.6.2 Cournot competition
The derivative of production with respect to a ￿rm￿s own R&D investment can




















where matrix A has been de￿ned in the Cournot part of Appendix 1. Invoking








−2†(N − 1) + †N2 + N − 2
(N − 1)(† − 1)(N − 2+†)
.
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71Figure 2: Critical values of ￿ σ




































72Figure 3: Coincidence of social and market constrained growth rates
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